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TAxATION
OVERVIEW
This survey article summarizes and discusses six important Tenth
Circuit decisions made in the area of taxation during the survey period.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in United
States v. Schmidt,' placed two limitations on the fifth amendment privilege
allowing a taxpayer not to produce business records during a tax investi-
gation. First, Schmidt requires the taxpayer to prove by specific evidence
that the danger of self-incrimination was substantial and real. Second,
Schmidt holds that the taxpayer may only claim the privilege for specific
documents and individual questions. In United States v. Kansas,2 the
Tenth Circuit found that the Kansas tax system, 3 which used military
income to compute tax brackets for Kansas source income, did not vio-
late the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act's 4 ban on taxing military com-
pensation. Another decision of the court, United States v. Payne,5 limited
the good faith misunderstanding of law defense to certain criminal tax
prosecutions. The Tenth Circuit held the defense may only be used
where the mistake of law is not based on a misunderstanding of the
United States Constitution. In Smalldridge v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue,6 the court held that a taxpayer could not switch his tax return status
to "married, joint" after the Commissioner had filed a tax return in the
taxpayer's name with a "married, separate" status. First Western Govern-
ment Securities, Inc. v. United States,7 dealt with a Revenue Agent Ruling
(RAR) which mentioned the plaintiff had invoked the privilege against
self-incrimination. The court held that the RAR could be disclosed to
the public because it was not "return information" within Internal Reve-
nue Code (I.R.C.) section 6103(a). Finally, Flanagan v. United States,8 es-
tablishes that a split interest transfer, pursuant to I.R.C. section
2055(e)(2), does not occur where property under a will is transferred to
charity via a settlement agreement.
I. INTERPRETATION OF FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE NOT TO PRODUCE
DOCUMENTS IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES
A. Background
The United States Supreme Court has determined that the contents
1. 816 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1987).
2. 810 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1987).
3. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-32,109(h) (1984), 79-32,110(a) & (b) (1979), 79-32,115(d)
& (e) (1979), 79-32,116 (1978), and 79-32,117 (1982).
4. 50 U.S.C. App. § 574 (1981).
5. 800 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1986).
6. 804 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1986).
7. 796 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1986).
8. 810 F.2d 930 (10th Cir. 1987).
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of business records9 prepared voluntarily in the normal course of busi-
ness are not privileged under the fifth amendment.' 0 In United States v.
Doe,'I however, the Court held the act of producing subpoenaed business
records may be privileged.12 The Court reasoned that when a taxpayer
produces his business records, he makes certain admissions including
the fact that the records exist, that they are in his possession or control,
and that they are authentic. 13 The Supreme Court held that these
admissions are privileged under the fifth amendment if the facts and
circumstances indicate the admissions are "testimonial" and
"incriminating." 14
The Supreme Court, however, did not provide a definite standard
for either "testimonial" or "incriminating".' 5 When the Tenth Circuit
tried to apply this test to the fact pattern in Schmidt,16 it attempted to
give meaning to the concept of "testimonial self-incrimination". It did
so by holding that a taxpayer could only invoke the self-incrimination
privilege for the act of producing business records where 1) the taxpayer
proved by specific evidence that the danger of self-incrimination was sub-
stantial and real 17 and 2) the taxpayer claimed the privilege only for
specific documents and individual questions.'
8
B. United States v. Schmidt
1. Statement of Case
In this case, 19 Mr. and Mrs. Schmidt were being audited regarding
their federal income tax liability for 1981 to 1983. On two different oc-
casions, the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) issued an administrative
summons to Mr. and Mrs. Schmidt which directed them to testify before
9. The contents of personal records are privileged under the fifth amendment. The
Supreme Court has attempted to justify this distinction between personal and business
records on two grounds. First, the Court has held that individuals have no privacy interest
in organization records. Second, the Court has held that the government interest in con-
trolling business crime outweighs any personal privacy concerns. Some commentators,
believing these distinctions are no longer persuasive, have argued that the contents of
both personal and business records should be privileged. E.g., Organizational Papers and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 99 HARV. L. REV. 640 (1986).
10. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974); United States v. White, 322 U.S.
694, 698 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 384-85 (1911). See generally S.
SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 385-88 (2d ed. 1984); Friendly, The Fifth
Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671, 679-98
(1968) (for a discussion of the rationales underlying the fifth amendment).
!1. 454 U.S. 605 (1984).
12. Id. at 612.
13. Id. at 613 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976)).
14. Doe, 465 U.S. at 613; Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (3rd Cir. 1976);
accord Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (2nd Cir. 1957).
15. In fact the Court's ambiguity led one judge to sarcastically thank the Court for its
'amphibolic guidance" in creating "the most recent example of... uncertainty [in the
law.]" In re Grand Juiy Subpoenas Served Feb. 27, 1984, 599 F. Supp. 1006, 1008-09 (E.D.
Wash. 1984) (Opinion of Quackenbush, J.).
16. 816 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1987).
17. Id. at 1481.
18. Id. at 1481-82.
19. 816 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1987).
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Revenue Agent Kawbata and to produce certain documents. Both
times, the Schmidts appeared as ordered and were willing to answer
questions. They claimed, however, a fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination based on Doe,20 and therefore refused to produce any
documents. On both occasions, Agent Kawbata terminated the pro-
ceeding because the Schmidts declined to produce the subpoenaed
documents.
The I.R.S. sought judicial enforcement of the summonses to require
production of these documents. The United States District Court for
the District of Utah granted the I.R.S. an order for enforcement. The
taxpayers appealed.
2 1
2. Discussion and Analysis of Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's de-
cision that the Schmidts had not properly invoked the fifth amendment
privilege in order for them to not produce business records. As noted
above, the United States Supreme Court held the act of producing sub-
poenaed business records privileged if the production involved a risk of
"testimonial self-incrimination" ' 22 because the act of producing would
force the taxpayer to make certain admissions.2 3 The Tenth Circuit
applied the United States Supreme Court's "testimonial self-incrimina-
tion" standard to the Schmidt fact pattern by interpreting the standard to
include two restrictions. 24 First, the taxpayer would have to prove by
specific evidence that the danger of self-incrimination was substantial
and real. This would require the taxpayer to prove that he or she had a
"'reasonable cause to apprehend danger' upon giving a responsive an-
swer that 'would support a conviction' or 'would furnish a link in the
chain of evidence needed to prosecute.' "25 The Schmidts did not meet
this burden. The court referred to the Schmidts' claim of self-incrimina-
tion as "speculative and generalized."' 26 The court, however, did not
reveal what evidence the Schmidts had offered or what degree of speci-
ficity would be necessary in the future to substantiate a fifth amendment
self-incrimination privilege. 2 7 Second, the Tenth Circuit limited the
20. Id. at 1480 (citing Doe, 465 U.S. at 605). See supra notes 9-18 and accompanying
text.
21. Schmidt, 816 F.2d at 1478-80.
22. Id. at 1480 (citing Doe, 465 U.S. at 611-612).
23. Doe, 465 U.S. at 613 n. I1 ("enforcement of the subpoenas would compel [the
taxpayer] to admit that the records exist, that they are in his possession, and that they are
authentic. These communications, if made under compulsion of a court decree, would
violate [the taxpayer's] fifth amendment rights.").
24. For a survey of the many ways Doe could be interpreted see Note, The Fifth Amend-
ment and Production of Documents After United States v. Doe, 66 B.U.L. REV. 95 (1986).
25. Schmidt, 816 F.2d at 1481 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486
(1951)). Accord Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968) (risk of self-incrimina-
tion must not be "merely trifling or imaginary.
26. Schmidt, 816 F.2d at 1481.
27. This may be a shortcoming in the opinion because to the extent that the "specific
evidence" test is left undefined, the court is merely trading one ambiguous standard
(Supreme Court's "testimonial self-incrimination") for another. In this respect, future
courts and attorneys may not find a great deal of guidance in this opinion.
1988]
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fifth amendment self-incrimination privilege to specific documents and
individual questions. The Schmidts could not claim a blanket, genera-
lized privilege not to produce any of the documents demanded in the
summons. They would have to produce some documents, but would be
allowed to claim some specific documents as privileged.
28
3. Implication of Holding
There is still a great deal of uncertainty as to when the act of pro-
ducing business documents is "testimonial" and "incriminating" such
that a taxpayer may claim a fifth amendment privilege not to produce
records. However, the Tenth Circuit appears to be defining these terms
by focusing on the degree of specificity. Thus, in the future, it appears
that the Tenth Circuit will require a taxpayer to present evidence proof
that there is a substantial and real danger of self-incrimination. Addi-
tionally, the court will allow the privilege to be invoked only for specific
documents.
II. INTERPLAY BETWEEN KANSAS INCOME TAX STATUTE AND THE
SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' CIVIL RELIEF ACT OF 1940
A. Background
Before the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 194029 (SSCRA)
was enacted by Congress, there was a dispute among the states regard-
ing which state(s) should be able to tax the income of military personnel.
For example, a service person might be a resident of Colorado, but be
stationed in New Mexico pursuant to military orders. The service per-
son would be put in the difficult position of being taxed on the same
military compensation in both states. Congress stopped this inequity by
enacting the SSCRA which vested the sole right to tax income of military
personnel in the home state ("residence" or "domicile") of such per-
sons, as opposed to the state where service persons were stationed.3 0 In
United States v. Kansas,3s the court addressed whether the Kansas tax sys-
tem3 2 indirectly taxed military income in violation of the SSCRA.
B. United States v. Kansas
1. Statement of Case
The Kansas income tax statutory scheme was more complicated
28. Schmidt, 816 F.2d at 1481-82 (citing Borgeson v. United States, 757 F.2d 1071,
1073 (10th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th
Cir. 1974)). Accord, United States v. G & G Advertising Co., 762 F.2d 632, 635 (8th Cir.
1985).
29. 50 U.S.C. App. § 574 (1981).
30. See 50 U.S.C. APP. § 574 (1981); California v. Buzard, 382 U.S. 386, 393 (1966);
Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322, 325-6 (1953) (construing H.R. REP. No. 2198, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 6 (1942); S. REP. No. 1558, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942)).
31. 810 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1987).
32. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 79-32,109(h) (1984), 79-32,110(a)(b) (1979), 79-32,115(d)(e)
(1979), 79-32,116 (1978), and 79-32,117 (1982).
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than the illustration given above. When calculating tax brackets for non-
military income earned in Kansas (Kansas source income), the Kansas
statutes took into account the military wages of non-resident service per-
sonnel stationed in Kansas. Inclusion of this military income would
push the taxpayer into a higher tax bracket, causing the Kansas source
income to be taxed at a higher rate than if the military wages had not
been considered.
The Kansas tax system made a real dollar difference in the tax liabil-
ity of service persons.33 Indeed, both Kansas and the United States
agreed that including military wages in Kansas tax-rate calculations
would result in higher Kansas state income taxes.
34
The United States contended that the Kansas tax system was an in-
direct tax on military income because the taxpayer would have had a
lower Kansas tax liability if not for his service earnings. Kansas argued
that its tax statutes did not levy an indirect tax on military income be-
cause the tax was actually levied only on Kansas source income and not
the military income.
The United States District Court for Kansas did not allow a full trial
on the issue of whether the Kansas tax system imposed a tax on military
income. Rather, it dismissed the United States' complaint. The United
States appealed, arguing the Kansas income tax statutes conflicted with
the SSCRA's prohibition against taxing military pay. Therefore, the
United States contended, that the Kansas provisions should be struck
down under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
3 5
33. The United States illustrated:
Assume that a nonresident serviceman stationed in Kansas earns $10,000 from
his military employment and earns an additional $10,000 of Kansas source in-
come. In that circumstance, his Kansas adjusted gross income would be $20,000.
Assuming for the sake of simplicity that he has no Kansas deductions or exemp-
tions, his Kansas taxable income would also be $20,000 and the tentative tax
computed on that income would be $1,200. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-32, 110(a)
(1979). The serviceman's modified Kansas source income would be $10,000, i.e.,
his $20,000 Kansas adjusted gross income less his military income. Thus, the
final tax due would be $600 ($1,200 x $10,000/$20,000). Had the serviceman in
the above example, however, earned only the $10,000 Kansas source income, his
tax liability would have been $450. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-32, 110. Accordingly,
the serviceman in the example, solely as the result of the inclusion of his military
compensation in the tax formula, would be required to pay $150 more in Kansas
income tax than if his military compensation were excluded from such formula.
Brief for Appellant at 12-13, United States v. Kansas, 810 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1987).
34. Kansas, 810 F.2d at 936. In fact, the Tenth Circuit noted that these higher income
taxes would most often hit some of our more destitute military families, those who were
forced to supplement their incomes with second jobs because the family units could not
make ends meet on the military pay alone. Id. at 936, n. 2.
35. In the process of concluding that the Kansas income tax statutes did not violate
the SSCRA, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit gave a concise review of its
Supremacy Clause analysis. (Kansas, 810 F.2d at 936-38 (citing Louisianna Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 476 U.S. 355 (1986), Hillsborough County
v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985), State Corp. Comm'n
v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 787 F.2d 1421, 1425 (10th Cir. 1986)). The court
noted that a state law will be struck down under the Supremacy Clause if it "conflicts with
a federal law or a federal constitutional right." Kansas, 810 F.2d at 937. A conflict has been
established where the state law '" 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' "Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519, 526 (1977) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). With these princi-
1988]
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2. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision to dismiss the United States' complaint. 36 The appel-
late court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Sullivan v.
United States.3 7 In that case, the Court held that a state statute, which
imposed a 3.5 percent sales tax on retail sales and a complimentary use
tax, did not violate the SSCRA. The Supreme Court reasoned that this
statutory scheme taxed the property sold or used rather than the mili-
tary income spent to pay the taxes.3 8 The Tenth Circuit applied Sullivan
to the instant case by holding that the Kansas statutes were merely a
potentially higher tax on income derived in Kansas, rather than an indi-
rect tax on the military income, even though military income was used to
compute tax brackets.
39
The Tenth Circuit also noted that nontaxable property could be
used to calculate tax brackets. Such a practice was not a violation of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 40 The Tenth Circuit re-
lied on two older Supreme Court cases 4 1 for the proposition that using
nontaxable property as a measure for calculating other taxes was not a
tax on the nontaxable property.
4 2
3. Implication of Holding
In future cases, this decision could be limited to its facts. The lan-
guage of the opinion, however, is sufficiently broad that it might be cited
in later decisions for the general proposition that the SSCRA allows
some forms of indirect taxation on service income. This would be the
pies in mind, the Tenth Circuit will follow the U.S. Supreme Court's two-step test of
(1) construing the state and the federal statute and (2) determining whether the two stat-
utes as construed conflict with each other. Kansas, 810 F.2d at 937 (citing Chicago & N. W.
Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Title Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981), Perez v. Campbell, 402
U.S. 637, 644 (1971), and United States v. Onslow County Bd. of Educ., 728 F.2d 628, 635
(4th Cir. 1984)).
36. Even though it held against the military in this case, the court of appeals recog-
nized the United States Supreme Court's directive to interpret the Act "'with an eye
friendly to those who dropped their affairs to answer their country's call.'" Kansas, 810
F.2d at 937 (quoting California v. Buzard, 382 U.S. 386, 395 (1966) (quoting Le Maistre v.
Leffers, 333 U.S. 1, 6 (1948)). See also Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561 (1943). The court
also recognized the SSCRA's purpose, "to broadly free servicemen of the burden of sup-
porting the governments of the states where they are present solely in compliance with
military orders." California, 382 U.S. at 393; Dameron, 345 U.S. at 326.
37. 395 U.S. 169 (1969).
38. Id. at 175. The Supreme Court also noted that the SSCRA could not be inter-
preted beyond its express purpose. "[SSCRA] does not relieve servicemen stationed away
from home from all taxes of the host State. It was enacted with the much narrower design
'to prevent multiple State taxation of the property.' " Id. at 180.
39. Kansas, 810 F.2d at 938.
40. The United States did not raise due process or equal protection arguments and
conceded that there were no due process violations. Kansas, 810 F.2d at 938. Rather, the
United States assault on the Kansas tax system was grounded solely on the Supremacy
Clause.
41. Id. (citing Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937); Maxwell v.
Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525 (1919)).
42. Id. (quoting .MIaywell, 250 U.S. at 539).
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case where the tax is most appropriately categorized as a tax on some
property other than military income, rather than a tax on service
compensation.
III. GOOD FAITH MISUNDERSTANDING OF LAW DEFENSE TO A CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION FOR NOT FILING INCOME TAX RETURNS
A. Background
Section 7203 of Title 26 of the United States Code makes it a crime
to willfully fail to file income tax returns. In the past, the Tenth Circuit
had recognized some defenses to this provision by establishing that a
taxpayer did not meet the required element of willfulness if he acted
through "negligence, inadvertence, justifiable excuse, mistake, or due to
a good faith misunderstanding of the law." '4 3 The Tenth Circuit further
made it clear that a good faith misunderstanding of law was based on a
subjective standard (the taxpayer's personal state of mind) as opposed
to an objective test (reasonable taxpayer standard).
4 4
In Phillips, for example, the defendant's conviction for willfully fail-
ing to file income tax returns was reversed by the Tenth Circuit because
a jury instruction had stated, "[a] mistake of law must be objectively reason-
able to be a defense .... -45 In holding that the mistake of law defense
must be measured by a subjective standard, the Tenth Circuit relied on
Supreme Court decisions which inferred that a subjective standard
should be employed in assessing willfulness in criminal tax prosecu-
tions.46 The Tenth Circuit also cited other circuit court decisions which
required a subjective test for measuring willfulness in criminal tax
prosecutions.
4 7
Yet, in the United States v. Payne decision, 48 the Tenth Circuit may
have slightly undercut the subjective standard for the mistake of law de-
fense. The court of appeals held that where the mistake of law is based
on a misunderstanding of our highest law, the United States Constitu-
tion, the subjective standard for willfulness is not applicable.
43. United States v. Harrold, 796 F.2d 1275 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Phillips,
775 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979).
44. Phillips, 775 F.2d at 264.
45. Id. at 263.
46. The Supreme Court has defined willfulness as an "intentional violation of a
known legal duty." United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976) (quoting United
States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973)).
47. See United States v. Aitken, 755 F.2d 188, 191 (lst Cir. 1985); United States v.
Burton, 737 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Krager, 711 F.2d 6, 7 (2d Cir.
1983); United States v. Ingredient Technology Corp., 698 F.2d 88, 97 (2d Cir. 1983), ert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983); Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d 1249, 1253 n.4 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1975); Mann v. United States, 319 F.2d 404, 409-10 (5th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 986 (1964); Yarborough v. United States, 230 F.2d 56, 61
(4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 969 (1956); Battjes v. United States, 172 F.2d 1,4 (6th
Cir. 1949).
48. 800 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1986).
19881
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B. United States v. Payne
1. Statement of Case
Mr. Payne's misunderstanding of the law revolved around his inter-
pretation of the fifth and thirteenth amendments to the Constitution.
He believed the fifth amendment permitted him to not file a tax return
and that the federal tax system violated the thirteenth amendment's pro-
hibition against involuntary servitude.
4 9
Mr. Payne filed tax returns for the years 1965 to 1975. Yet in 1976,
increasingly aware of constitutional concerns surrounding the payment
of income tax, Mr. Payne filed what he called a "fifth amendment" re-
turn in which he refused to pay taxes. He soon amended his 1976 re-
turn, however, and met his tax liability for that year. Finally, in 1977,
Mr. Payne decided to express his constitutional objections to the tax sys-
tem by not filing any tax return.
50
The Tenth Circuit admitted that Mr. Payne was "certainly fixed in
his beliefs and perhaps sincere." However, it concluded that Mr. Payne
was "very misguided and must now suffer the consequences." '5 1 The
"consequences" were one year in prison, three years of probation after
incarceration, and ten thousand dollars in fines.
2. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
a. Good Faith Misunderstanding of Law as Defense for Failure to
File Income Tax Returns
On appeal, before the Tenth Circuit, Mr. Payne objected to the dis-
trict court's instructions to the jury on the ground that the instructions
resulted in an objective standard for "good faith misunderstanding of
the law." Specifically, Mr. Payne objected to the jury instruction stating
that Mr. Payne's "belief that the tax laws violate his constitutional rights
does not constitute a good faith misunderstanding of the requirements
of the law." 52 The Tenth Circuit upheld this instruction by distinguish-
ing between people who understand the conditions of the law but refuse
to meet the law's criteria, and those people who mistakenly believe the
law does not require them to act. 5 3 It would appear that this distinction
would support the subjective test if the jury were allowed to decide
whether the defendant fits into the former or into the latter category.
Mr. Payne might have truly misunderstood the fifth and the thirteenth
amendments to the Constitution. On the other hand, he might have had
a perfect understanding that the Constitution required him to file tax
returns, but stubbornly refused to do so notwithstanding such knowl-
edge. Mr. Payne was entitled to have the jury make this decision. The
49. Id. at 228.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 229.
52. Id. at 228.
53. Id. at 228 (quoting United States v. Ware, 608 F.2d 400, 405 (10th Cir. 1979). See




complained of instruction appears to assume that any misunderstanding
of constitutional law cannot be held in good faith-that such a belief
does not constitute a good faith misunderstanding.
54
It is difficult to understand why the court would seemingly remove
from the jury's consideration whether a misunderstanding of the Consti-
tution could constitute a good faith misunderstanding of law. After all,
the court has already mandated that misunderstandings of other less im-
portant laws must be considered by the jury as relevant to the willful-
ness/intent element.
5 5
b. Admissibility of Certain Evidence in Criminal Tax Prosecution for
Not Filing Income Tax Returns
The Tenth Circuit held that the I.R.S. could present evidence of Mr.
Payne's gross income. 56 The court found such evidence admissible on
the grounds that it showed that his failure to file was "willful." Thus,
the evidence showed that Mr. Payne knew he had made enough income
to trigger the filing requirement. 5 7 In another evidentiary ruling, the
Tenth Circuit determined that Mr. Payne would be prevented from
showing that, despite his large gross income, his actual tax liability was
minuscule. The court held that such evidence was irrelevant. 5 8 Yet,
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 makes it very difficult to exclude evidence
on relevance grounds. 59 The fact that his actual tax obligation was mi-
nuscule should therefore be relevant to determine whether he actually
misunderstood the Constitution or understood it perfectly but was just
attempting to avoid a large tax bill.
60
54. The jury appeared to rely on the court's instruction that a misunderstanding of
constitutional law would not negate the element of willfulness. Mr. Payne's brief on ap-
peal pointed out that the jury "requested clarification of intent" by asking the judge,
"Does this [the intent element embodied in willfulness] mean that Mr. Payne simply in-
tended not to file returns ... or was his purpose for not filing?" Brief for Appellant's at 7,
United States v. Payne, 800 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1986). The judge responded by repeating
the same instruction quoted earlier. Thus, it appears the jury was confused as to whether
Mr. Payne's "purpose for not filing," which was his misunderstanding of the Constitution,
was relevant to the intent element of willfulness.
55. As the Appellant's Brief notes, there is little difference between:
A) I did not believe I was legally required to file because the statutory pro-
visions of Title 26 [of the United States] Code do not apply to me; or,
B) I did not believe I was legally required to file because the provisions of
the Constitution forbid it. That [is] why the tax system is a voluntary system and
legally I do not have to volunteer to file because the [clourts will not require me
to voluntarily waive my [clonstitutional [r]ights.
Brief for Appellants at -, United States v. Payne, 800 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1986).
56. Payne, 800 F.2d at 229. Mr. Payne's income was approximately $100,000. per year.
57. Interestingly enough, Mr. Payne was willing to stipulate that his gross income was
over the dollar figure necessary to trigger the filing requirement. However, the I.R.S.
refused this offer, insisting instead on the jury's hearing exactly how much Mr. Payne
made. It would appear that if the I.R.S. truly sought admission of this evidence to prove
that the filing requirement had been triggered, a stipulation to that effect would have
reached this goal most convincingly.
58. Payne, 800 F.2d at 229 (citing United States v. Stillhammer, 706 F.2d 1072, 1075
(10th Cir. 1983) and United States v. Garcia, 553 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1977)).
59. Evidence is relevant where it makes any fact of consequence more or less prob-
able. FED. R. EviD. 401.
60. Mr. Payne objected to the dual effect the following two evidentiary rulings: 1) the
1988]
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4. Implication of Holding
This decision appears to modify the subjective standard of Phillips
for determining willfulness in criminal tax prosecutions. The Tenth
Circuit apparently will not allow a defendant the benefit of the subjec-
tive standard when the law of the United States Constitution is misun-
derstood rather than any other law.
IV. INTERPLAY BETWEEN INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
SECTIONS 6013 AND 6020
A. Background
Section 6013 of the Internal Revenue Code 61 provides that a mar-
ried individual who has filed a separate return for a given year may,
under certain circumstances, switch to a married,joint return. Usually, a
married couple will minimize tax liability by filingjointly instead of sepa-
rately. Thus, section 6013 allows a married taxpayer to reduce his tax
liability by switching to the joint status. This is the case even where the
taxpayer does not realize that the joint status is more favorable until
after he had filed a separate return.
Section 6020 of the Internal Revenue Code allows the Commis-
sioner to file a return for a taxpayer when that individual has not done
so himself.6 2 The issue of whether a taxpayer could utilize I.R.C. sec-
tion 6013 by switching to a married, joint status after the Commissioner
had already filed on behalf of the taxpayer, pursuant to I.R.C. section
6020, was addressed in Smalldridge v. Commissioner.
63
B. Smalldridge v. Commissioner
1. Statement of Case
Mr. Smalldridge did not file his federal income tax returns for sev-
eral years. His employer, however, withheld taxes throughout this pe-
riod and sent a wage statement to the I.R.S. Based on this data, but
without any information regarding items such as deductions or exemp-
tions which would reduce tax liability, the Commissioner filed a return
for the taxpayer pursuant to I.R.C. section 6020. When filing these re-
turns "on behalf of" Mr. Smalldridge, the Commissioner elected the
married, separate status for the taxpayer even though Mr. Smalldridge
had filed using married, joint status for a number of years. 6 4 As is typi-
cal for most taxpayers, Mr. Smalldridge's tax liability would have been
I.R.S. refusal to allow stipulation, and 2) the I.R.S. opposition to demonstrating that his
actual tax liability was minimal. Mr. Payne felt the combined effect of these rulings
prejudiced the jury by painting a picture of a rich man, well able to pay his taxes, who
nonetheless proceeded to deprive his country of an assumably great amount of money.
Payne, 800 F.2d at 227.
61. I.R.C. § 6013 (1984).
62. I.R.C. § 6020 (1984).
63. 804 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1986).
64. Id. See also Brief for Appellant at 5, Smalldridge v. Commissioner, 804 F.2d 125
(10th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant Smalldridge].
644 [Vol. 65:4
TAXATION
lower if the Commissioner had elected married, joint status for him.6 5
Mr. Smalldridge petitioned the United States Tax Court to allow
him to switch his return status from married, separate status to married,
joint status pursuant to I.R.C. section 6013(b). The tax court dismissed
Mr. Smalldridge's petition, however, holding that the taxpayer's option
to switch status would not be allowed where the Commissioner had filed
a tax return for the taxpayer. Mr. Smalldridge appealed on the grounds
that 1) a correct reading of I.R.C. section 6013 and section 6020 to-
gether, would not allow the Commissioner, while purportedly acting on
behalf of the taxpayer, to refuse to consider anything which would re-
duce tax liability; and 2) allowing the I.R.S. to file a return for the tax-
payer pursuant to I.R.C. section 6020 without allowing the taxpayer to
switch to a married, joint status under I.R.C. section 6013 was a taking
of property without due process of law under the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution.
66
3. Discussion and Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
a. Interplay Between Internal Revenue
Sections 6013 and 6020
Section 6013 of I.R.C. only allows the taxpayer to switch to a mar-
ried, joint status where he has not been sent a notice of deficiency. Mr.
Smalldridge had been sent such a notice. However, Mr. Smalldridge
argued that this part of section 6013 should be applicable only where
the taxpayer himself had filed a return. This would prevent the Com-
missioner from choosing the separate status where the taxpayer had
used the joint status for years and joint status would significantly reduce
tax liability.
6 7
The court of appeals did not accept Mr. Smalldridge's argument
and reasoned that the Commissioner had to make some election of sta-
tus in order to file a return.6 8 The court held that once the Commis-
sioner had filed a return for Mr. Smalldridge, the taxpayer was "in the
same position" as if he himself had elected to file and did file a return. 69
This reasoning seems flawed. While the Commissioner did have to
make some election regarding status, there was no reason for him to
choose a status which went against all past practice of the taxpayer and
which would generally result in a higher tax liability. 70 Further, the tax-
payer was not "in the same position" as if he had filed a separate return.
If Mr. Smalldridge himself had filed a separate return, he would not
have received a notice of deficiency. Instead, he would have been able
to switch to the married, joint status. Indeed, the very essence of Mr.
65. See supra notes 45-46.
66. Smalldridge, 804 F.2d at 126.
67. Id. at 128.
68. Id. at 127.
69. Id. at 128. See also Conovitz v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 929, 931 (1980);
Rev. Rul. 70-632, 1970-2 C.B. 286.
70. Smalldridge, 804 F.2d at 125. See Brief for Appellant Smalldridge at 5 and n.43.
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Smalldridge's appeal was the fact that he was put in an entirely different
position than he would have been if he had filed himself.
7 1
b. Due Process of Law
Mr. Smalldridge also appealed on the basis that allowing the I.R.S.
to file a return for the taxpayer pursuant to I.R.C. section 6020 without
allowing the taxpayer to switch to a married, joint status under I.R.C.
section 6013 was a taking of property without due process of law under
the fifth amendment. Smalldridge argued that he had done nothing
which would lead a reasonable person to believe that he gave up his
property right to switch to a married, joint status. 72
Interestingly, although the court did recognize that one of the
grounds for the appeal was that the deficiency had been assessed with-
out due process of law, 73 the Tenth Circuit did not discuss this due pro-
cess issue. Thus, it is evident that the court must have read appellant's
brief, which devoted several pages to the due process issue, however,
the Tenth Circuit ignored the issue in its opinion.
7"
4. Implication of Holding
Where a taxpayer for any reason neglects to file a tax return, he or
she is taking the risk that the Commissioner will file a return on his or
her behalf. If the Commissioner acts as he did in this case, the Commis-
sioner's filing a return could result in the taxpayer incuring a greater tax
liability than if the taxpayer had filed himself. This is so because the
Commissioner may take all the evidence of a taxpayer's income while
ignoring any deductions, exemptions, and past status practices which
minimize tax liability.
V. MEANING OF "RETURN INFORMATION" WITHIN INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE SECTION 6103 AND WHEN RETURN INFORMATION MAY
BE DISCLOSED BY THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
UNDER SECTION 6103(H)(4)
A. Background
Section 6103(a) of I.R.C. makes information on tax returns confi-
71. Smalldidge, 804 F.2d at 126-27.
72. As appellant Smalldridge stated in his brief:
The Smalldridge's had for a number of years previous to the years in question,
always filed joint tax returns, and the I.R.S. had no basis to believe that any
change had occurred in their status so as to prohibit or terminate that election
.... General due process notions require that the Petitioners, before they are
deprived of the benefit of the joint filing election, be on reasonable notice of the
effect of their actions.
Brief for Appellant Smalldridge at 5-6.
73. Smalldridge, 804 F.2d at 126.
74. The opinion appeared to rely on a type of you-made-your-bed-now-lie-in-it phi-
losophy. For instance, the court began its analysis by proclaiming, -[t]he failure of the
taxpayer to himself file any return for those years is the inescapable root of the present
problem." Smalldridge, 804 F.2d at 127.
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dential and prohibits the I.R.S. from disclosing it. 75 Return information
is defined in I.R.C. section 6103(b)(2) 76 as specifically including the tax-
payer's identity and whether he is subject to an investigation. 77 A
number of exceptions exist to the general non-disclosure rule. 7 8 One of
these is I.R.C. section 6103 (h)(4)(C). This provision allows disclosure
of return information where 1) the disclosure is to a judicial or adminis-
trative proceeding; 2) the return information involves a transactional re-
lationship between a party to the proceeding and the taxpayer; and
3) the return information directly affects the resolution of an issue in the
proceeding.
First Western Government Securities, Inc. v. United States 79 involves a
Revenue Agent Ruling (RAR) which revealed the fact that the president
of First Western had invoked the fifth amendment privilege. First, the
court considered whether the RAR was tax return information.8 0 Sec-
ond, assuming arguendo that the RAR was return information, the court
considered whether the RAR fit within the exception to the non-disclo-
sure rule.
8 1
B. First Western Government Securities, Inc. v. United States
1. Statement of Case
Sidney Samuels was president of both First Western Government
Securities Incorporated and Samuels, Kramer and Company (the Cor-
porations). The I.R.S. suspected the Corporations of promoting abu-
sive tax shelters.8 2 During an investigation of twenty-five of the
Corporations' customers, the I.R.S. served seventy-five summonses on
Mr. Samuels which called for both testimony and production of corpo-
rate records. At Mr. Samuels' deposition, he invoked his fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination 135 times.
8 3
Before Mr. Samuels's deposition, a RAR had been sent to some of
the Corporations' customers. The RAR explained why the I.R.S. was
disallowing certain of the customers' deductions as abusive tax shelters.
After Samuels's deposition, the I.R.S. revised the RAR to include the
fact that Mr. Samuels had invoked the fifth amendment privilege. This
revised RAR was sent to many of the Corporations' Denver customers.
8 4
75. I.R.C. § 6103(a) (1987).
76. 1.R.C. § 6103(b)(2) (1987).
77. Different circuits have ennunciated varied standards for return information. For a
very extensive discussion of the circuit interpretations, see Note, Information Disclosure and
Competent Authority: A Proposal, 17 CASE W. RES. 485 (1985).
78. Many commentators believe that I.R.C. § 6103 should be interpreted to allow for
greater disclosure. For some persuasive arguments in favor of that position see Comment,
The Freedom of Information Act and the .R.S. Confidentiality Statute: A Proper Analysis, 54 U. CIN.
L. REV. 605 (1985).
79. 796 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1986).
80. Id. at 359.
81. Id. at 360.
82. Id. at 357.
83. Id. at 357-58.
84. Id. at 358.
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Mr. Samuels and the Corporations filed suit against the I.R.S. claiming
that this disclosure was tax return information and thus fell within the
nondisclosure protection of I.R.C. section 6103(a). The district court
granted summary judgment8 5 in favor of the I.R.S.; subsequently, Mr.
Samuels and the Corporations appealed.
2. Discussion of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that Mr.
Samuels' invocation of the fifth amendment was not "return informa-
tion." The court also held, that even if it were considered to be return
information, it fit within an exception to the non-disclosure rule.
86
a. Meaning of Return Information
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis of whether Mr. Samuels' invo-
cation of the fifth amendment privilege was tax return information by
noting the standard for tax return information established by the Sixth
Circuit. 8 7 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that information is
confidential tax return information where a "nexus" exists between "the
data obtained and the furtherance of obligations controlled by Title
26."88
The Sixth Circuit applied this nexus standard in Mid-South Music v.
United States Department of the Treasury.89 In that case, the I.R.S. sent let-
ters to taxpayers which mentioned plaintiff's name and stated that the
taxpayers would be audited if they claimed certain deductions. The
court reasoned that the letters contained return information because
they revealed both plaintiff's identity and the fact that plaintiff was
under investigation.9 0
The Tenth Circuit carefully noted the Sixth Circuit's standard for
return information, but it did not specifically adopt or reject it. The
Tenth Circuit found that it did not need to adopt a standard for the
instant case because Mr. Samuels' invocation of the fifth amendment
privilege was not return information under any standard.9 ' First, the
85. The Tenth Circuit reiterated that its test for summary judgment under FED. R.
Civ. P. 56, is whether any genuine issue of material fact remains when all evidence is con-
strued in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Id. at 357.
86. Id. at 360.
87. Id. at 358-59. The Tenth Circuit also noted the standards for tax return informa-
tion developed by other circuits: The Ninth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit
had defined return information not to include "data in a form which cannot be associated
with or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer." Long v. United
States I.R.S., 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980). See also Neufeld
v. I.R.S., 646 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Thus, data tapes and check sheets were not return
information where all mention of taxpayer names, addresses, and social security numbers
were expunged. Long, 596 F.2d at 362.
88. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 688 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1982), reh. denied, 696 F.2d
449 (1982).
89. 579 F. Supp 481 (M.D. Tenn. 1983), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 756 F.2d 23 (6th Cir.
1984).
90. Mid-South Music, 756 F.2d at 25.
91. First Western, 796 F.2d at 359-60.
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invocation was not made during an audit of Mr. Samuels. Instead, his
statements were made during an investigation of his customers in Dal-
las. The court found that the nondisclosure protection of I.R.C. section
6103 could only be invoked by a party under investigation. 9 2 Second,
the RAR did not contain return information because it did not disclose
plaintiffs' names in the context that they would be investigated.
93
b. Exception to Non-Disclosure General Rule
The Tenth Circuit noted that even if the invocation of the fifth
amendment was based upon return information, the I.R.S. had a right to
disclose the information under an exception to the non-disclosure
rule. 94 The Tenth Circuit held that this exception to the non-disclosure
rule had been met. First, the audit of the plaintiffs' customers was an
administrative proceeding. Second, a transactional relationship existed
between the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs' customers, who were parties to
the proceeding. Finally, Mr. Samuels' invocation of the fifth amend-
ment, regarding the return information, directly affected the resolution
of an issue in the proceeding.
9 5
3. Implication of Holding
While the Tenth Circuit found that it did not need to adopt a stan-
dard for return information to decide the instant case, it did carefully
review the Sixth Circuit's nexus test. Although predicting which stan-
dard a court will adopt is always uncertain, the First Western decision
could indicate that the Tenth Circuit is strongly considering the nexus
test.
VI. INTERPRETATION OF SPLIT INTEREST TRANSFERS WITHIN INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE SECTION 2055(E)(2)
A. Background
Section 2055(a) of the I.R.C. permits charitable contributions to be
deducted from a decedent's gross estate before computing estate taxes.
I.R.C. section 2055(e)(2), however, disallows such deductions if the
92. Id. at 359.
93. First Western, 796 F.2d at 359. The two elements present in the Sixth Circuit's Mid-
South Music decision were also present in the instant case: 1) plaintiff was identified by
name; and 2) an investigation of plaintiff, if not explicitly expressed, was clearly implied be-
cause a person would have no reason to invoke the fifth amendment privilege unless an
investigation was occurring or threatened.
94. First Western, 796 F.2d at 360-61 (following I.R.C. § 6013(h)(4)(C) (1984).
95. Id. at 360-61. The Fifth Circuit held that I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(C) granted an excep-
tion to the non-disclosure rule only where the information was disclosed to federal officials
as opposed to the general public. Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979). The Tenth Circuit specifically rejected the Fifth Circuit's in-
terpretation. The Teeth Circuit held that I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)(C) applied to disclosures
made to anyone because (in contrast to § 6103(h)(1), (2), and (3)) the statutory language
did not specifically limit itself to disclosures made to federal officials. First Western, 796
F.2d at 360. The Tenth Circuit's decision on this matter is in accord with Davidson v.
Brady, 559 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Mich. 1983), aftd, 732 F.2d 552 (6th Cir. 1984).
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charitable contributions are deemed to be split interest transfers. A split
interest transfer occurs when property under a decedent's will is first
transferred to a noncharitable entity, such as an heir or devisee, and
then transferred to a bona fide charity. 9 6 In Flanagan v. United States,
9 7
the Tenth Circuit decided whether a split interest transfer had occurred
where property passed under a settlement agreement to a bona fide
charity.
B. Flanagan v. United States
1. Statement of Case
On April 21, 1976, Frank Parkes died, leaving an estate valued in
excess of one million dollars. With the exception of a few bequests, Mr.
Parkes devised his estate to a charitable trust for the purpose of further-
ing high standards in horse breeding and training. His heirs sought to
have the will set aside. Eventually, the heirs and the trustees agreed to a
settlement under which part of the estate went to an Oklahoma charita-
ble foundation.
The estate filed its federal estate tax return claiming a charitable
deduction for the property transferred to the foundation under the set-
tlement agreement. The I.R.S. disallowed the charitable deduction on
the ground that a split interest transfer had occurred. 98 The administra-
tor of the estate paid the taxes allegedly owed and then sought a tax
refund in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma. The district court denied the administrator's claim for a re-
fund and the administrator appealed.
2. Discussion of the Tenth Circuit's Opinion
a. Interpretation of Split Interest Transfer
The Tenth Circuit Court reversed the district court's decision by
holding that a split interest transfer did not occur where property under
a will passed pursuant to a settlement agreement. The I.R.S. had held
that a split interest transfer occurred in this situation and the district
court accepted the I.R.S. determination. The Tenth Circuit disagreed
with the I.R.S. reasoning because the court decided the reasoning was
inconsistent with other I.R.S. determinations.9 9 The court noted that
logically the I.R.S. ruling concerning settlement agreements should
96. There are also some exceptions to the general rule that split interest transfers are
disallowed: I.R.C. § 2055(e)(A) & (B) allow charitable contributions which are split inter-
est transfers to be deducted from the decedent's gross estate when the contributions are in
the form of a charitable remainder or a guaranteed annuity.
97. 810 F.2d 930 (10th Cir. 1987).
98. Id. at 933. The I.R.S. reached its decision by reasoning that the property first
passed under the will and subsequently when the parties came to a settlement agreement,
part of the property passed pursuant to that agreement. As a result of two different docu-
ments, the will and the settlement agreement, portions of the property passed to two dif-
ferent entities, a charitable and a noncharitable entity. The I.R.S. considered this a split
interest transfer. Rev. Rul. 77-491, 1977-2 C.B. 332.
99. Flanagan, 810 F.2d at 933-34.
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have applied to a spouse's election to set aside a will in order to take her
statutory share. This is because both a settlement agreement and an
election to take a statutory share have the effect of partially abrogating a
will after the death of the testator. 10 0 It would have made sense for the
I.R.S. to hold that all of the property passed under the will and then part
of the property passed in a different manner when the spouse elected
her statutory share.' 0 ' The I.R.S., however, did not come to this con-
clusion. Instead, it decided that a settlement agreement would create a
split interest transfer, whereas a spouse's election would not result in a
split interest transfer. 10 2 The I.R.S. attempted to distinguish the two
situations by holding that they had "different effects recognized for fed-
eral estate tax purposes."'
0 3
The Tenth Circuit stated that the I.R.S. position was "a distinction
without a difference,"' 0 4 and determined that neither a settlement
agreement nor a spouse's election created a split interest transfer. The
court held that such property only passed pursuant to the settlement
agreement or to the spouse's election and never passed under the will.
Thus, the property was never transferred to both a charitable and a non-
charitable entity and consequently a split interest transfer did not oc-
cur. 10 5 Since a split interest transfer did not occur, a charitable
contribution could be deducted from a decedent's gross estate. Accord-
ingly, the district court's decision was reversed.
10 6
b. Weight of Revenue Rulings
In reaching its decision regarding what constituted a split interest
transfer, the Tenth Circuit overturned a Revenue Ruling. This ruling
had erroneously determined that a split interest transfer occurred when
property under a will was distributed according to a settlement agree-
ment.' 0 7 In overturning the ruling, the Tenth Circuit recognized that
Revenue Rulings, while entitled to consideration, were in fact nothing
more than an agency's opinion of the law. 10 8 The Tenth Circuit refused
to "blindly resolve all doubts in favor of the I.R.S."' 0 9 Rather, the court
held that Revenue Rulings which interpreted legislation would have to
be examined to determine whether they were in accord with congres-
sional intent. '' 0
Applying this holding, the court noted that Congress enacted I.R.C.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 934.
102. Id. at 933-34. See Rev. Rul. 77-491, 1977-2 C.B. 332 (property passing under set-
tlement agreement is split interest transfer); Rev. Rul. 78-152, 1978-1 C.B. 297 (property
passing under spouse's election is not split interest transfer).
103. Flanagan, 810 F.2d at 933; Rev. Rul. 78-152, 1978-1 C.B. 297.
104. Flanagan, 810 F.2d at 934.
105. Id. at 934.
106. Id. at 935.
107. Id. at 934 (overturning Rev. Rul. 77-491, 1977-2 C.B. 333).
108. Flanagan, 810 F.2d at 934.
109. Id. at 935.
110. Id. at 934 (citing BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 596-97 (1983)).
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section 2055 to promote charitable contributions. Ill Also, the Tenth
Circuit specifically adopted the Seventh Circuit's finding that Congress
placed a greater value on charitable contibutions than on estate
taxes.' 12 Since the Revenue Rulings regarding split interest transfers
had the effect of maximizing taxes instead of charitable contributions,
the Tenth Circuit determined that the Revenue Rulings were not consis-
tent with congressional intent.' 
1
3. Implication of Holding
The Tenth Circuit's decision may motivate parties engaged in fu-
ture settlement agreements to allocate part of the property covered by
the agreement to charity. Such an allocation will be rewarded by a tax
deduction, which will promote the congressional purpose behind I.R.C.
section 2055 which encourages charitable contributions.
CONCLUSION
This article has summarized certain taxation decisions of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. United States v. Schmidt 114
restricted the fifth amendment privilege not to produce business records
during a tax investigation. United States v. Kansas 115 held that using mili-
tary income to compute tax brackets for Kansas source income did not
violate the SSCRA 116 ban on taxing military compensation. United States
v. Payne 117 narrowed the good faith misunderstanding of law defense in
certain criminal tax prosecutions. Smalidridge v. Commissioner 118 held that
a taxpayer could not substitute a married, joint tax return for a married,
separate return filed by the Commissioner on the taxpayer's behalf. First
Western Government Securities, Inc. v. United States 1 19 found that a Revenue
Agent Ruling revealing plaintiff's invocation of the fifth amendment was
not "return information" within I.R.C. section 6103(b)(2). Finally,
Flanagan v. United States 120 established that a split interest transfer pur-
suant to I.R.C. section 2055(e)(2) does not occur when property left by a
will is transferred to charity via a settlement agreement.
Rosalee Rodda
111. Id. at 934; See also Commissioner v. Estate of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187, 190 n.3
(1955); YMCA v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47, 50 (1924).
112. Flanagan, 810 F.2d at 934-35; See also Norris v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 796 (7th
Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 756 (1943).
113. Flanagan, 810 F.2d at 934-35.
114. 816 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir. 1987).
115. 810 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1987).
116. 50 U.S.C. App. § 574 (1981).
117. 800 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1986).
118. 804 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1986).
119. 796 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1986).
120. 810 F.2d 930 (10th Cir. 1987).
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